Purpose 

While this information is targeted at ships operating on ocean going voyages, the risks apply equally to all vessels carrying BEVs. Vessel types mentioned in this notice are roll-on, roll-off passenger ferries (RORO PAX) and pure car and truck carriers (PCTC). BEVs have been in operation for some time. Current statistics indicate that BEVs are less likely to catch fire than conventional internal combustion engine vehicles. Electric vehicle battery fires are rare. The available data indicate the fire risk is between 60 times greater¹ for internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles. However, the consequences of a BEV fire can be higher. 

PCTC Fremantle Highway in July 2023. Photo courtesy of Brookes Bell.

Risks associated with battery-powered vehicles 

Increase in weight of the vehicles in comparison with internal combustion engine vehicles of the same footprint. There is an approximate 25% increase in weight compared to vehicles of the same footprint². This may result in deck loading limitations being exceeded and could adversely affect the stability of the vessel, if not accounted for. 

The risk of a fire should a battery cell go into thermal runaway. This is when the heat generated within a battery exceeds the amount of heat that is dissipated to its surroundings. Without intervention (cooling) the internal battery temperature will continue to rise and with this the potential for a fire to spread and an explosion to occur if the resultant gases are allowed to build-up in the space. Most modern BEV’s have an internal cooling system to maintain battery temperature. Modern batteries are designed to vent instead of exploding however the vented gases need to be extracted from any enclosed spaces to avoid pressure building-up and leading to an explosion. 

While the likelihood of fires for BEVs is very low compared to fires from internal combustion engines (ICE vehicles are 60 time more likely to catch fire), the fires involving BEVs reach full potential in a shorter period in comparison. Typically flames shoot upwards and outwards simultaneously. BEV fires can reach temperatures of more than 1600 degrees centigrade, hot enough to burn metals like aluminium, commonly used in BEV construction to reduce weight. See below diagram which compares the time taken by BEV fires. 

Figure 1: Time taken to reach maximum fire potential. Graph courtesy of Brookes Bell. 

The gases produced by BEV fires form a vapour cloud which is both toxic and potentially explosive (hydrogen). For every 1-kilowatt hour (KWh) of battery power, 6000 litres of vapour are produced. A single 55 KWh battery could produce 330,000 litres of vapour. 

Significantly increased likelihood of re-ignition of a BEV fire.  These fires are a chemical chain reaction, cooling with water slows the reaction but doesn’t stop it completely.  Once the cooling is removed, heat from the chemical chain reaction will build up rapidly once again and re-ignition is highly probable.  

Detection and prevention of thermal runaway 

To assist in the prevention and early detection of thermal runaway ship operators should consider the following: 

• As with ICE vehicle, crews should inspect BEVs before and after loading to ensure they are safe to load. With BEV’s crews should ensure no damage has occurred to the battery or if the battery management system is displaying any faults. Some BEVs have a lower ground clearance and may be damaged during loading.  
• If damaged, a small amount of fluid may leak from under the vehicle. The battery and drive-unit are liquid-cooled, typically with glycol-based automotive coolant. The coolant is typically either clear or blue in colour and if found leaking, may indicate the high-voltage battery casing has been damaged. Any fluid leakage must be investigated immediately and should prompt further action following investigation. 
• Smoke detectors situated on the vehicle decks may take some time to activate as the smoke flow from the thermal runaway can be prevented from reaching detectors due to the physical design of the vehicle decks and the airflow created by ventilation systems.  
• Flame detectors are designed to detect the infrared radiation of fires. Such detectors are activated by the presence of flames; thus, it is possible to identify the location of vehicles on fire and respond quickly. 
• The installation of closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems with flame recognition capabilities/ thermal detection properties where vehicles, including BEVs, are located can allow early detection of fires. Typically, thermal runaway can be detected at 60-70 degrees centigrade. The position of CCTV systems should be considered. Typically, these are placed fore and aft on a vehicle deck. Operators should consider fitting increased numbers of CCTV cameras with thermal detection capabilities in the athwartship directions to enable rapid detection of thermal runaway. This also allows for the precise location of the fire to be identified. 
• Charging stations for BEVs while enroute should be installed in compliance with the SOLAS regulation II-1/45, and SOLAS regulation II-2/20.3. There is further guidance in the IMO Maritime Safety Committee Circular 1615 “Interim Guidelines for Minimizing the Incidence and Consequences of Fires in Ro-Ro Spaces and Special Category Spaces of New and Existing Ro-Ro Passenger Ships”. 
• BEVs should be clearly marked and should ideally be located in a designated area known to the crew. The location should, where possible, be on weather decks, away from dangerous goods, have sufficient drainage, adequate separation between vehicles for crew members wearing breathing apparatus to access from multiple access paths and be well clear of all emergency muster points. 
• Crew members who conduct safety patrols of the vehicle decks should be made familiar with the early signs of thermal runaway and if possible equipped with thermal handheld detectors. Early indications of thermal runaway are: 
  • Off-gassing. This is a release of various gases from the battery, including carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, hydrogen, and volatile organic compounds. During the early phase of gas generation, the off-gases can be heavier than air and accumulate at deck-level or be lighter than air and dissipate or accumulate at deck-head level if the space is not appropriately ventilated. Owing to the various battery chemistries, it is not possible to predict which will dominate. 
  • A damaged battery can create rapid heating of the battery cells. If you notice hissing, whistling, or popping, a possible sweet chemical smell, black “smoke” (nanoparticles of heavy metals, not smoke) or white vapour coming from the high-voltage battery or the vehicle generally, assume that it is in thermal runaway and take appropriate firefighting measures.  Early intervention will minimise the spread of any fire to adjacent vehicles.  
  • Fire patrols should pay special attention to look for evidence of battery coolant leakage, smoke or heat from the areas of vehicles where a battery is normally located, for example the underside. They should also listen for “popping sounds” which may be indicative of a potential thermal-runaway event. 
• Crew should conduct frequent emergency drills and training in the identification and initial response to a BEV battery fire. Early detection and prompt action can minimise the spread of a fire. 

MV Fremantle Highway. Photo courtesy of Netherlands Coastguard.

Fire-fighting and BEVs 

Vessel operators should consider the following when developing operational plans for fighting fires involving BEVs: 

• In the instance of a fire involving a BEV the only way to cool the battery is to use large amounts of water. Typically to fight a conventionally fuelled vehicle fire would require 4000 litres of water. It is estimated that a BEV fire would take a minimum of 10000 litres. The Danish firefighting authorities (DEMA) recommended using water at the rate of 400 litres per minute and limiting the exposure of persons fighting the fire to ten minutes³. 
• PCTC’s typically do not have water deluge systems and rely on carbon-dioxide (CO2) systems to extinguish fires on their vehicle decks. It should be noted the significantly increased risk of re-ignition with BEV fires and that CO2 systems do not remove the heat generated from a fire nor extract the highly flammable gasses emitted from a BEV fire. 
• CO2 extinguishing systems if applied quickly after the detection and verification/confirmation of a fire have worked successfully to fight fires on board PCTCs. Research projects are ongoing to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of the CO2 extinguishing systems. The International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) recommends doubling the capacity of CO2 systems on PCTC’s. Operators should consult with their recognised organisations regarding the amount of CO2 allocated for use in vehicle spaces used to carry BEVs.  
• Early detection, confirmation/verification and a short response time are crucial to fight a fire successfully on PCTC. The fixed firefighting systems should be applied first rather than manual firefighting by the crew. 
• With RORO PAX ferries the early use of the water deluge system is likely to control the spread of the fire and allow a controlled response. Crew should be familiar with its correct use and the need for the water to be effectively drained from the vehicle decks so as not to adversely affect the stability of the vessel. The highly flammable vapour emitted from the BEV fire should also be ventilated from any enclosed spaces to minimise the risk of explosion. RORO PAX vessel master's should closely monitor the flow of vapour from the BEV fire and manoeuvre the vessel to ensure the vapour is moved away from passenger areas and emergency stations such as lifeboat launching and embarkation areas. 
• Other methods to restrict the flame and heat spread such as specialist vehicle fire blankets or other specialist textile boundaries may be used until sufficient water quantity is available. However, in using these blankets / specialist boundaries careful consideration must first be given to the specific risks that may be encountered. These include restricted access around vehicles on a ro-ro deck and the rapid escalation of the BEV fire including gases and smoke that may reduce visibility and produce extreme heat for personnel approaching the fire. These fire blankets may be best suited as a precautionary measure deployed where a vehicle has been identified as being at increased fire risk e.g., if battery coolant is found leaking during routine fire patrol. While vehicle fire blankets will contain flame, the thermal-runaway event will continue. 
• The fumes produced by BEV fires are toxic and emergency teams responding to fires should be equipped with fire-fighting suits that comply with SOLAS II-2 regulation 10.10. Decontamination procedures should also be incorporated in fire-fighting plans as BEV fires may create hydrogen fluoride. This is a hazardous substance that may penetrate protective clothing. It is highly corrosive and toxic and will cause chemical burns if it permeates through clothing and comes in to contact with skin. A ship’s procedures for dealing with clothing and equipment exposed to BEV fires should address this risk. 
• BEV crews should have additional equipment to ensure their safety when fighting BEV fires, including:  
  • Defibrillator 
  • Gloves rated for high voltage use 
  • Gas detector to analyse the atmosphere for explosive gases. 
• Until the chemical chain reaction exhausts itself, there is significant risk of re-ignition.  A fully-equipped fire-fighting team should be monitoring the fire site and able to respond immediately until the vehicle is removed from the ship. 
• Vessel operators should consider providing crew with additional safety equipment (such as full-face respirators) to protect them from the toxic vapour produced by BEV fires when conducting emergency duties such as preparing lifeboats for launching. spirators) to protect them from the toxic vapour produced by BEV fires when conducting emergency duties such as preparing lifeboats for launching. 

Guidelines 

• https://lashfire.eu/ 
• MGN 653 (M) Amendment 1 electric vehicles onboard passenger roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ferries - GOV.UK
• ELBAS project  
• MSC Circulars / MSC.1/Circ.1615 
• EMSA guidance

Disclaimer 

This marine notice provides general information and is for awareness only. It should not be relied upon for decision making purposes - ship owners, operators, masters and crew should undertake their own risk assessments and act accordingly. 

¹ https://www.autoinsuranceez.com/gas-vs-electric-car-fires/

² MGN 653 (M) Amendment 1 electric vehicles onboard passenger roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) ferries - GOV.UK

³ ELBAS project

Provision of safe access 

Accessing a vessel while at berth or anchor is a routine activity which is sometimes taken for granted. The requirement for safe access can be overlooked, particularly where there are limited berthing options, or a vessel is only berthed for a short period. Failing to provide safe access can result in serious injuries and even fatalities—even more so when poor weather or extreme tidal variation are thrown into the mix.

Legislative requirements

SOLAS Chapter II-1 provides requirements for accommodation ladders and gangways. SOLAS Chapter IX gives effect to the International Safety Management (ISM) Code which requires procedures, plans, and instructions for key shipboard operations. Providing safe access to a vessel is considered a key operation under the ISM Code and should be addressed in the vessel’s safety management system.

In addition, Marine Order 12 (Construction—subdivision and stability, machinery and electrical installations) imposes responsibilities on the masters of vessels to ensure a vessel’s means of access is safe for users.  Seafarers need to be familiar with the risks associated with providing a means of access and ensure appropriate risk controls are in place. 

Personnel abilities

The type of vessel access should be selected based on the experience and physical abilities of the people boarding the vessel as per ISO 5488:2015 and MSC.1/Circ. 1331. Their capability must be assessed prior to them embarking or disembarking, particularly when using a combination pilot and accommodation ladder. People using these ladders must be confident in using the equipment safely.

Wharf arrangements

When a vessel is alongside at a berth, the provision of safe access is a shared responsibility between the vessel and the provider of the berth. Often, it is poor wharf design that prevents landing a gangway, and this has a significant impact on safe access arrangements. The master and any provider of the means of access are both responsible for ensuring that a safe means of access is used.

Communication

This is important in identifying obstacles to safe access. Items such as water/fuel manifolds, bollards, and electrical installations on the wharf are common obstructions and need to be considered when allocating berths to vessels. Co-ordination between shore-side and the vessel’s crew can help to mitigate these issues.

Rigging accommodation ladders and gangways

SOLAS Chapter II-1 Regulation 3 9 and MSC. 1/ Circ.1331 include requirements for safely rigging vessel access equipment. In Australia, these standards are implemented through Marine Order 12 (section 24) and include: 

• Gangways should not be used at an angle of inclination greater than 30 degrees from the horizontal.
• Ship accommodation ladders should not be used at angles greater than 55 degrees from the horizontal, unless designed and constructed for use at angles greater than these and marked as such.
• Adequate lighting, lifebuoys and a mounted safety net which are sufficient to prevent falls, must be provided.

It is also recommended that accommodation ladders and gangways are positioned well forward of the propeller and avoid the lower part of the ladder and gangway overhanging off steep ship sides.

Gangways should be frequently monitored and adjusted as required to ensure they do not become too steep and are firmly landed on the wharf edge. Gangway providers are responsible to ensure adequate resources are afforded to adjust gangways as required by the master.

Assess the risks of rigging access

Rigging or adjusting gangways, accommodation ladders, or other access methods involves a heightened level of risks such as entanglement, falling from heights, or falling overboard. It is important to conduct a risk assessment of the rigging, adjusting and derigging of access equipment, including the selection of appropriate equipment and secondary means of support.  

Suspended accommodation ladders

Arrangements at some berths in Australia prevent accommodation ladders being safely landed on the wharf edge. In such situations it is common practice to suspend the ship’s accommodation ladder at the vessel’s side with a short brow or gangway fitted to the lower accommodation ladder platform, to bridge the gap between the vessel and wharf edge.
Accommodation ladders and gangways are designed and tested to be landed on solid surfaces. Suspending these access arrangements goes against their engineering and presents an unacceptable risk to safety. 

Access by pilot ladder

A pilot ladder, or combination ladder, is often provided to access vessels at anchor. Marine Order 12 (subsection 24(9)) makes it clear that the master may provide a pilot ladder as a means of access if they ensure only pilots and other professionals such as crew or cargo masters  use the ladder. In an emergency, the master may allow another person to use the ladder (subsection 24(10)). 

This is a high-risk activity, validated by recent incidents where non-professionals or people who were unfamiliar with pilot ladders died after falling from these heights.

Marine Notice 04/2023 – Pilot Ladder Transfer Arrangements and Marine Notice 2021/06 – Fatal accidents from falling off pilot ladders on ships provide further information and guidance on risks associated with using pilot ladders as a means of access. 

Further reading

• MSC.1/Circ.1331 – Guidelines for Construction, Installation, Maintenance, and Inspection/Survey of means of Embarkation and Disembarkation
• ILO Code of Practice: Accident prevention on board ship at sea and in port (Section 3.4 - Shore-side access to ships; Section 8 - Safe access to ship)
• AMSA Maritime Safety Awareness Bulletin issue 10—Safe vessel access
• ATSB Report - Fall from the pilot ladder on the bulk carrier Atlantic Princess, Whyalla, South Australia on 3 July 2013. Investigation Number 300-MO-2013-007

Regulations 

In accordance with the Collision Regulations, ‘every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing conditions to make a full appraisal of the situation and risk of collision’ (Rule 5). The Collision Regulations are implemented in Australia through the Navigation Act 2012 (s175).  

Specific requirements for maintaining bridge visibility are set out in International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 Chapter V Regulation 22, which in Australia is implemented through Marine Order 21 (Safety and emergency arrangements) 2016).  

Bridge visibility that does not meet the requirements of SOLAS significantly impedes safe navigation, bridge watchkeeping and maintaining a proper lookout.  All of which are essential in the detection of vessels (particularly small and at close range), detecting craft or persons in distress, making a full appraisal of the situation and the risk of collision, and avoiding collision and stranding.  

To ensure that appropriate navigation bridge visibility exists, SOLAS requires (in part) that on any vessel over 55m in length: 

• there are no blind sectors caused by cargo   or other obstructions forward of the beam exceeding 10 degrees
• the view of the sea surface shall not be obscured by the lesser of two ship lengths or 500m under all conditions of draught, trim, and deck cargo.    

Australia’s interpretation

Where a vessel is operated not in compliance with the minimum bridge visibility requirements specified in SOLAS, AMSA will take appropriate action in line with our compliance and enforcement policy to reduce the risk to persons, other vessels and the environment.

Some flag States may issue ‘dispensations’ allowing vessels to carry cargo up to the approximate level of the navigation bridge windows (see photo below). It is Australia’s view that SOLAS does not provide for such dispensations and such documents are not accepted for compliance purposes in Australia.  

The guidance document assists compliance with the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) requirements on board ships by providing advice to crews on how to record the various operations in the Oil Record Book. In particular, the guidance document provides advice on using the correct codes and item numbers to ensure a more uniform port State control procedure.

The guidance is to be applied in conjunction with the amendments to MARPOL Annex I that entered into force on 1 January 2011. The guidance document provides specific examples for the recording of information within the Oil Record Book Part I for the following:

• collection of oil residues (sludge)
• disposal or transfer of oil residues (sludge)
• non-automatic discharge overboard or disposal otherwise of bilge water which has accumulated in machinery spaces
• automatic  discharge  overboard  or disposal otherwise of bilge water which has accumulated in machinery spaces
• condition of oil filtering equipment
• accidental  or other  exceptional  discharge  of oil
• bunkering of fuel or bulk lubricating oil
• additional operational procedures and general remarks
• tankers with slop tanks, and
• general guidance – additional voluntary recordings.

A copy of the guidance document, MEPC.1/Circ.736/Rev.2 can be obtained from the IMO website or by contacting Environment.Standards@amsa.gov.au. Oil Record Books can be purchased from AMSA through the publications order form.

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

ECDIS – Guidance for Good Practice

Comprehensive guidance is available in International Maritime Organization (IMO) Circular MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev.1 ECDIS – Guidance for Good Practice. All masters and officers in charge of a navigational watch, and operators of ships fitted with ECDIS, are encouraged to use this guidance to facilitate the safe and effective use of ECDIS.

ECDIS training requirements

The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requires all officers who carry out navigational tasks to be appropriately trained.

All officers in charge of a navigational watch must have a thorough knowledge of and ability to use nautical charts and nautical publications (see STCW Code Table A-II/1). 

This requirement is further recognised under the provisions of the International Safety Management Code, sections 6 and 7.

Port State control (PSC) inspections

Masters and officers in charge of a navigational watch must be able to demonstrate competency with functionality of the ECDIS and particularly critical functions essential to safe navigation. These functions may include but are not limited to:

• Entering safety settings (i.e. safety depths and contours) appropriate to the ship and its intended voyage.
• Setting and response to ECDIS alarms, such as those for crossing safety contours, deviation from route, positioning system failure, and approach to critical points.
• Entering and route checking voyage plans.
• Updating ENCs. 
• Alternate methods of position fixing.

AMSA PSC officers may take action when there are clear grounds to believe the master or officers in charge of a navigational watch are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the operation of ECDIS. They also may take action to ensure the ship does not leave port until the situation is resolved within the requirements of the relevant Convention.

Electronic Navigation Charts (ENCs)

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter V Regulation 27 requires that all nautical charts and publications necessary for an intended voyage shall be adequate and up to date.

The definition of a nautical chart in SOLAS V/2 includes a special-purpose map or book, or ‘a specially compiled database’. This includes official ENCs and Raster Navigational Charts (RNCs).

The Australian Hydrographic Office (AHO) produces official ENCs (AusENC) for Australian, Australian Antarctic Territory, Papua New Guinea, and Solomon Islands waters.

There is complete ENC coverage of Australian waters. ECDIS operating in raster chart display system (RCDS) mode must not be used when navigating in Australian waters. The use of RNCs when ENCs are available is not permitted in Australia.

For an ENC to be considered adequate for navigational purposes, it must be issued officially by or on the authority of a national hydrographic office. ENCs must be kept up to date using the latest available official Notice to Mariners. The ENC must be of appropriate scale and suitable for the navigational task at hand.

AMSA recommends masters and officers in charge of a navigational watch familiarise themselves with information on AusENC provided on the AHO website.

References

MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev.1 - ECDIS – Guidance for Good Practice

AMSA Website - ECDIS 

Australian Hydrographic Office

AMSA Website – Port State Control

Maritime Safety Awareness Bulletin issue 14

Background

Some of the safety issues associated with groundings and collisions are related to inadequate passage planning, lack of situational awareness, and poor communications. These can be due to inadequate training, poor navigational practices, and a lack of supporting safety systems. 

In addition to risks to the safety of crew and ship, there is the likelihood of harm to the marine environment.  In extreme cases, this can be irreversible and detrimental to local communities. Environmental harm can result in significant clean-up costs, as well as irretrievable reputational loss.  

Responsible navigational practices 

It is the responsibility of masters and operators to ensure the principles applying to the keeping of a safe watch—as detailed in Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code—are followed and identified in the ship’s safety management system (SMS). These include:

• Use of a variety of navigational aids to verify the ship’s position at appropriate intervals considering the ships speed and proximity to navigational hazards. 
• Verification of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) positional information by terrestrial means, such as visual bearings and/or by radar.
• Understanding the capabilities of the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) and its features, including:
  • Cross Track Limits
  • Over scaling Electronic Navigation Charts (ENCs)
  • Look ahead function
  • Safety contours and depth alarms
• Wherever possible, use radar overlay and parallel index techniques to monitor a ship’s adherence to its planned track.
• Consideration of the guidelines for voyage planning, as adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution A.893(21).
• Use of soundings, clearing bearings and transits as cross-checks for position fixes and course alteration points.
• Consideration of the categories of zones of confidence (CATZOC), which tell us horizontal and depth accuracy of the hydrographic data.
• Ensure the ship has the latest maritime safety information (MSI) for the area by configuring its Enhanced Group Call (EGC) receiver correctly. 
• Operators, as well as watchkeepers, need to be aware of human factors principles, including fatigue management and bridge resource management techniques.
• Cooperation with any available vessel traffic service. 

Bridge Resource Management 

Bridge Resource Management (BRM) techniques, which include efficient watchkeeping arrangements and passage planning, are integral to responsible navigation practices. A clear understanding of the agreed passage plan and the establishment of a ‘shared mental model’ by the entire bridge team forms the basis of a safe voyage.

The STCW Code provides standards for the level of proficiency needed for the proper performance of functions on board ship. 

To support safe navigation and minimise the potential for incidents, mariners should be familiar with the provisions of:

• Marine Order 28 (Operations standards and procedures) 2015; and
• Part A-VIII/2 (Watchkeeping arrangements and principles to be observed) of Chapter VIII of the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code (Part A).

Effective BRM begins at the initial passage planning stage and includes the following considerations:

• Navigational and operational tasks and responsibilities should be clearly defined and delegated.
• Dangers that may be encountered at any stage of the voyage should be identified as early as possible.
• Where an ECDIS is used, the voyage plan should be validated by the route-checking function using applicable safety parameters; additionally, a visual check of the intended tracks using an appropriate scale for viewing should be done.
• Navigational, operational, and general safety priorities should be set and consistently reviewed in the context of the prevailing circumstances and conditions.
• Any amendment to the voyage plan while on passage should be thoroughly checked and approved by the master before implementation.
• Any changes made to the voyage plan are consistent with IMO guidelines and are clearly marked and recorded in the ship’s official documents.
• Masters and officers in charge of a navigational watch, who regularly undertake the same voyage / route, should be mindful of the risks associated with human performance limitations (such as the effects of fatigue and workload on vigilance and monitoring tasks) and familiarity, to retain resilience.
• Masters and officers in charge of a navigational watch are responsible for the safe navigation of their ships at all times, including when a pilot is on board. The master should ensure the bridge remains adequately manned and under the responsibility of a certificated officer in charge of a navigational watch.

AMSA Bridge Resource Management Advisory Note 

The AMSA Bridge Resource Management Advisory Note advises pilots on techniques to enhance safety and reduce the risk of single person errors when conducting coastal pilotage operations.

It provides advice on BRM and passage planning, BRM principles in the STCW code, human performance limitations and crew responsibilities, and single person error risk reduction. 
AMSA recommends masters and officers familiarise themselves with the Bridge Resource Management Advisory Note on the AMSA website. 

Mariner’s Handbook for Australian Waters (AHP20)

The Mariner’s Handbook for Australian Waters (AHP20) contains information required by international and Australian commercial vessels operating in Australian waters. 

The handbook provides information that enables vessels to operate safely and in accordance with relevant maritime rules and regulations for operations in Australian water. It also provides advice on emergency contacts and where additional information may be found to meet particular circumstances.

AMSA considers it necessary for all international and Australian commercial vessels operating in Australian waters to carry the Mariner’s Handbook for Australian Waters. 

Resources

AMSA Bridge Resource Management Advisory Note
Mariner’s Handbook for Australian Waters (AHP20)
AMSA Safety Awareness Bulletin 14
AMSA Website - ECDIS
 

Background

Transfers using pilot ladders are high risk activities. Fatalities have occurred when crew have fallen to their deaths while climbing up or down pilot ladders.

In August 2021, AMSA received notification of the death of a crewmember who fell into the water while climbing down the pilot ladder of a bulk carrier to board a crew transfer boat. That same day, the crewmember had signed off the vessel to go home.

Managing risks

Embarking and disembarking a vessel using a pilot ladder is a high-risk activity. Failing to provide safe access can be fatal.

A risk assessment for safe transfer of people by pilot ladder, or other means, should be part of the vessel’s safety management system.

Pilot ladders and associated equipment must comply with international standards (SOLAS V/23), be certified and properly maintained.

When considering the risk of use of a pilot ladder for transfer, as a minimum, attention should be given to:

• The experience and capability of people using the pilot ladder
• The physical demands of using a pilot ladder
• Sea state and weather conditions
• The ability of a launch or other vessel to act as a platform to safely transfer people to or from a pilot ladder
• Measures to prevent falls
• Emergency response if a person using the pilot ladder falls
• Use of other means of transfer which present a lower risk in the circumstances, such as a helicopter.

Further reading

AMSA’s Maritime Safety Awareness Bulletin issue 10—Safe vessel access provides further guidance on safe access including information on managing risks.

Marine notice 3/2019 – Pilot transfer arrangements.

Australian Transport Safety Bureau. Investigation Report into

Sachi Wimmer
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
September 2021

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

How can I receive SBAS signals?

You will need a SBAS-enabled GNSS receiver to use SouthPAN’s three early Open Services.  It is likely such receivers will need to be configured to receive the correct types of messages from SouthPAN. You should check with the manufacturer of your receiver to know more about its capabilities.

For more information about SouthPAN’s early Open Services, please go to the the GeoScience Australia website to see the SouthPAN Fact Sheet.

Coverage

The L1 SBAS early Open Service is available within the light blue area shown in the diagram below. 

The Dual Frequency Multi Constellation (DFMC) and Precise Point Positioning (PVS) early Open Services are available within the dotted lines.

More information

For more information and updates on SouthPAN, please visit Geoscience Australia. 

Marine notices have no legal standing. All current marine notices are listed below.

A marine notice that does not appear here is not current and may contain information which is no longer applicable.

You can subscribe to receive email notifications when new marine notices are introduced.

Recently cancelled marine notices

Supercedes 15/2009

This notice advises shipowners, ship operators and masters of:

• The latest guidance from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships;
• Information sharing arrangements in place regarding piracy incidents under the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP);
• Processes for reporting incidents of piracy  in Asia (Annex 1) and receiving piracy incident alerts; and
• Other applicable guidance.

The ongoing threat of piracy and armed attacks against ships presents significant challenges to vessels operating in certain regions. To reduce the effectiveness of hostile groups, it is essential that owners, operators, masters and crews of vessels operating in waters where attacks are likely are aware of the actions to be followed to ensure their safe passage. Such actions include appropriate precautionary measures, reporting of attacks and cooperation with criminal investigations when requested.

When entering high risk areas, ships should increase on board surveillance and security levels and prepare means of responding to attacks. A clear and comprehensive Ship Security Plan and the training of crews in security measures and response techniques are critical. While security plans and crew training may not prevent an incident occurring, these precautions should assist in reducing the likelihood of a successful attack and lessen the consequences.

Awareness of the types and extent of piracy and armed robbery attacks made against ships contributes to the coordination of an effective response by authorities. To assist in maintaining a comprehensive operational picture, it is vital that all piracy and related incidents, even minor events and sightings, are reported as soon as practicable. 

IMO Guidance

The IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) adopted a resolution in May 2011 on the Implementation of Best Management Practice Guidance, recognising the urgent need for merchant shipping to take every possible avenue to protect against pirate attack. Additionally, to assist in the prevention of piracy and armed robbery, the IMO has produced Circular MSC.1/Circ.1334 Guidance to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The guidance advocates effective self-protection measures as the best defence and recommends areas where action can be taken, such as reducing the amount of cash carried on board and emphasising the need for discretion regarding the future movements and possible cargo of ships.

To assist in gathering information following an incident, the MSC has produced MSC.1/Circ.1404 Guidelines to assist in the investigation of the crimes of piracy and armed robbery against ships, intended for use in conjunction with the Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships.

Each month, the IMO issues reports on piracy and armed robbery against ships. The reports, which include names and descriptions of ships attacked, position and time of attack, consequences to the crew, ship or cargo and actions taken by the crew and coastal authorities, are available at the IMO web site, www.imo.org. The IMO has also opened a Piracy and Armed Robbery module on the Global Integrated Shipping Information System, providing customised reports regarding the type, frequency and impact of attacks.

Maritime Security

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), which came into effect in 2004 and is implemented through Chapter XI-2 (Special measures to enhance maritime security) of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), contains a comprehensive set of measures to enhance ships’ security. One of these measures is the development of a Ship Security Plan to ensure protection of persons on board as well as the ship and its cargo from any suspicious act or circumstance, including piracy and armed robbery.

The ISPS Code is implemented in Australia through the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act (MTOSFA) 2003 and associated regulations. The Act legislates Australia’s maritime security requirements including matters to be addressed in a Ship Security Plan and the reporting of incidents of piracy or armed robbery. A copy of the Act can be accessed through the ComLaw web site: www.comlaw.gov.au. It is important to note that not all Australia registered ships are regulated under the MTOFSA. Passenger ships used for overseas or inter-State voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage or more that are used for overseas or inter-State voyages and a mobile offshore drilling unit that is on an overseas or inter-State voyage (other than a unit that is attached to the seabed) are required under the MTOFSA to have a Ship Security Plan.

ReCAAP

The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) located in Singapore, established under an inter-governmental agreement in 2006, serves as a platform for information exchange with the ReCAAP Focal points via the Information Network System (IFN). Through the cooperative approach offered by the IFN, the Focal Points are able to provide effective and appropriate responses to incidents. ReCAAP is also aimed at capacity building efforts to improve the capability of member countries in combating piracy and armed robbery in the region.

In Australia, Border Protection Command (BPC) is the lead Government agency responsible for coordinating a response to a piracy incident within the Australian Security Forces Authority Area (SFAA), which covers the same area as the Australian Search and Rescue Region (SRR) (shown at Annex 2). Australia became the 19th contracting party to ReCAAP in August 2013, underscoring Australia’s commitment to the eradication of piracy and the maintenance of secure and safe trade via the sea.

The Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre (AMSOC), located within BPC, is the Australian focal point responsible for coordinating communication to and from the ReCAAP ISC, the Australian shipping industry and other ReCAAP members. More information regarding BPC and AMSOC can be found at: www.customs.gov.au. 

The ReCAAP ISC produces quarterly reports detailing regional piracy and armed robbery incidents. These reports, as well as detailed information on the ReCAAP ISC, can be accessed at: www.recaap.org. Members of the public are able to register on the web site, should they need to report an incident of piracy or armed robbery against ships or consult the ReCAAP resource library.

Reporting piracy incidents

The IMO recommends that in the event of an occurrence masters should report all actual or attempted attacks of piracy and armed robbery or threats thereof, to:

• The nearest Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) or ReCAAP ISC;
• The flag State; and
• The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC).

In the event of an occurrence within the Australian SFAA, masters may contact AMSA or BPC (as the ReCAAP focal point) using the following numbers:

AMSA Rescue Coordination Centre: 
1800 641 792 or +61 2 6230 6811

Email: reports@amsa.gov.au 
(note this email address is not manned 24 hours)

BPC: 1800 06 1800 or +61 2 6246 1325
Email: amifc@customs.gov.au

AMSA in conjunction with BPC will manage an incident in accordance with existing procedures and provide assistance as appropriate. BPC will subsequently submit an incident report to the ReCAAP ISC and neighbouring Focal Points.

In the event of an occurrence in foreign waters, in addition to contacting the nearest RCC, masters may also report incidents of Piracy and Armed Robbery to the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) managed IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) in Kuala Lumpur. The centre operates 24 hours a day and can be contacted on the Maritime Security Hotline numbers:

Telephone:      +603 2031 0014
Facsimile:        +603 2078 5679
email:              piracy@icc-ccs.org or imbsecurity@icc-ccs.org

A flow diagram for reporting piracy and armed robbery incidents in Asia is included at Annex 1 to this notice.

Piracy Incident Alerts

A constant radio watch should be maintained with the appropriate shore or naval authorities when in areas where attacks have previously occurred. Continuous watch should also be maintained on all distress and safety frequencies, particularly VHF Channel 16. Ships should also ensure all maritime safety information broadcasts for the region are monitored e.g. NAVTEX and EGC SafetyNET service.

The IMB PRC broadcasts incidents of piracy and armed robbery to all ships in the Indian Ocean Region and the Atlantic Ocean Region via Inmarsat Safety Net System.  Live feeds are also available through the ICC website: www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-report

If an incident alert is received by AMOSC concerning the Australian SFAA, AMSOC will liaise with AMSA to ensure a broadcast to all ships and facilities within the area is issued.  AMOSC will also communicate relevant global incident reports through an established email distribution to industry groups and identified government entities.

Other guidance

For further information regarding maritime security and travel in Australia:

• BIMCO Publication The Ship Master’s Security Manual, 2013
• IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, 2012 edition
• International Chamber of Shipping Model Ship Security Plan, First Edition  
• AUSPIRACYPLAN 2014: Australian Government Piracy Response Plan (for Incidents in the Security Forces Authority Area)
•  The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides travel advice, including that related to piracy, at smartraveller.gov.au. 

Download Piracy and armed robbery against ships—marine notice 07/2015  PDF645.47 KB

Gary Prosser
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
May 2015

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Annex 1

• 

  Annex 2