Purpose 

To ensure that navigation corridors are used appropriately when planning on ECDIS, and to ensure that a voyage plan approved by the ship’s Master is executed within the planned navigation corridor so far as is reasonably practicable. 

Guidance for 

• Ship operators 
• Masters 
• Officers Of the Watch (OOW’s) 
• Recognised organisations 
• Flag states 

Voyage Planning with XTD/XTL (cross track distances or limits) 

“Voyage and passage planning includes appraisal, i.e. gathering all information relevant to the contemplated voyage or passage; detailed planning of the whole voyage or passage from berth to berth, including those areas necessitating the presence of a pilot; execution of the plan; and the monitoring of the progress of the vessel in the implementation of the plan”. IMO Guidelines for Voyage Planning (Res A.893(21)). 

Having made a full appraisal of the intended voyage, a detailed passage plan is to be plotted on an ECDIS whilst also factoring in the intended XTD/XTL from berth to berth for each leg. This determines the planned navigational corridor for each leg of the passage that is electronically checked for charted hazards using the route check function. Any specific dangers that are identified can then be considered and amended as necessary prior to the Master’s final approval of the overall passage plan and start of the voyage. 

When a bridge team is monitoring and executing the voyage, remaining within the planned navigation corridor is intended to minimise workload as it readily indicates pre-checked waters where the ship can safely navigate. 

The safety contour setting, which should be set at the safety depth, is used to define a generally “No-Go” area i.e. where the ship may be in imminent danger and should avoid where possible. Note that this setting uses the closest available chart contour that is at least as deep as the setting entered, for example if the chart has contours at 10m and 15m and the safety contour setting is 11m, then the safety contour on the chart will be the 15m contour. Depth soundings that are equal to or shallower than the safety depth will be black and must always be avoided (soundings deeper than the safety depth are grey).

Guidance for departing from the Planned Navigation Corridor into the Safety Margin. 

The voyage is expected to be executed in accordance with the voyage plan, and monitored to remain within the planned navigation corridor so far as is reasonably practicable. Any departure from the approved voyage plan is to be carefully considered.  

An adequate balance between the width of the planned navigational corridor and the safety margin is to be determined for each leg of the voyage plan by taking into account: 

• GNSS accuracy. 
• Vessel's characteristics. 
• ENC’s Zone of Confidence (ZoC). 
• Expected traffic conditions. 

Areas outside of the planned navigation corridor up to No-Go areas are considered a safety margin available for unplanned/unforeseen circumstances. Departing from the approved navigation corridor into the safety margin requires additional caution to maintain situational awareness since this area has not been electronically verified, pre checked or approved by the Master. 

When it is necessary to immediately use the safety margin outside the planned navigation corridor, a visual check and assessment of the ECDIS should be made by the bridge team and a plan discussed/agreed by all to execute a deviation and return as soon as possible given the circumstances. The use of ECDIS look ahead functionalities in such cases becomes paramount. 

Should a non-urgent deviation from the voyage plan be identified, the Master is to be consulted and the voyage plan amended prior to leaving the planned navigation corridor. 

Recording reasons for departing from the approved voyage plan will aid verification of sound navigation practices. 

AMSA recognises the need for reasonable use of the safety margins outside the planned navigation corridor. However, unreasonable, and systematic use of the safety margins may indicate the need to reassess the voyage planning practices.

Port State Control (PSC) inspections  

Voyage planning requirements giving effect to SOLAS requirements are established in Australian legislation in Marine Order 27. 

A deficiency may be considered where an Australian PSC Officer finds:

• unreasonable and systemic use of the safety margins outside of the planned navigation corridor.
• no consideration given in voyage planning to the variation in XTD/XTL depending on confined or open waters.

IMO references  

A.893(21) – Guidelines for Voyage Planning  

MSC.232(82) – Revised Performance Standards for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS)

MSC.530(106) – Performance standards for Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS)  

MSC.1/Circ.1503/Rev.2 ECDIS – Guidance for Good Practice  

This marine notice supersedes Marine Notice 03/2023.

Companies, owners and masters of ships are reminded of the requirement under the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC, 2006) for shore leave, which states that;

“Seafarers shall be granted shore leave to benefit their health and well-being and consistent with the operational requirements of their positions”. (MLC, 2006, Regulation 2.4, Paragraph2).

This requirement is implemented in Australian law in the Navigation Act 2012 and Marine Order 11 – Living and working conditions on vessels.

Companies are responsible for seafarer health, safety, and wellbeing. Shore leave and access to shore-based welfare facilities are key to seafarer physical and mental health and reduces the risk of fatigue.

AMSA expects that companies strongly consider the benefits to seafarer wellbeing and recovery when assessing the risks of allowing shore leave. AMSA reminds companies that the decision to grant shore leave should not be based on financial implications.

AMSA port State control officers may take action when there are clear grounds to believe the master or officers in charge of ships have not complied with the requirements as set out in the MLC 2006, for seafarers to access shore leave.

Should a company be advised that shore leave is not possible by a shoreside authority in Australia, this information should be provided to AMSA to investigate as the Competent Authority.

Whilst it is recognised that there are risks with communicable diseases that cannot be eliminated entirely, there are suitable and acceptable controls that can be put in place to allow seafarers to access shore leave safely.

A list of Port Welfare Committees and Australian Welfare providers can be found on the Australian Seafarers Welfare Council website.

This marine notice supersedes Marine Notice 10/2022.

Purpose

This marine notice draws the attention of vessel operators to the importance of planned maintenance in ensuring safe operation of ships, and highlights AMSA’s focus on planned maintenance during port State control (PSC) inspections.

Recent incidents have demonstrated the potentially serious consequences of a lack of effective maintenance of main engines and power generation systems that pose serious risks to the safe and pollution-free operation of ships. In response, AMSA has increased its focus on planned maintenance during routine PSC inspections to protect the safety of the crew, the ship and the environment. 

The International Safety Management Code (ISM Code)

The ISM Code is implemented in Australia through the Navigation Act 2012 and Marine Order 58 (Safe Management of Vessels).

The ISM Code requires maintenance of the ship and equipment, including that:

• maintenance inspections are held at appropriate intervals
• any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known
• appropriate corrective action is taken, and
• records of these activities are maintained.

In relation to maintenance, the ISM Code specifies that the ship’s safety management system (SMS) should:

• identify equipment and technical systems that would cause hazardous situations if they were to suddenly fail, and
• provide for specific measures (i.e. regular testing of all equipment including stand-by equipment or systems that are not in continuous use) to ensure the continued reliability of such equipment or systems

Maintenance activities need to be properly resourced, and procedures must be documented. 

Global supply chain issues

Given the potentially serious consequences when effective maintenance has not been completed, AMSA has increased focus on planned maintenance during routine port State control inspections to protect the safety of the crew, the vessel and the environment.  AMSA recognises there are supply chain challenges post the COVID-19 pandemic, and that these are exacerbated by additional regional challenges. AMSA expects operators to anticipate these challenges and to make provision to address them in planning maintenance to minimise impact. Specific measures already implemented by a Company as required by the ISM Code may need to be reviewed to ensure that those specific measures remain effective. This includes the ability to obtain spare parts expediently for equipment and technical systems that would cause hazardous situations if they failed.

In circumstances where spare parts cannot be provided, AMSA expects the ship operator will have consulted with equipment manufacturers, classification society and flag State in preparing appropriate measures to ensure the continued safe operation of equipment and the vessel. This could include for example the reduction in maximum continuous rating of an engine, or provision for towage services in coastal waters.

Inspections

During PSC inspections, AMSA will place a greater focus on planned maintenance of propulsion and auxiliary equipment and associated systems and will take necessary compliance actions to address any identified areas of concern. This may include requiring the physical attendance of classification society surveyors to verify the condition of critical equipment and its suitability to continue to function under all voyage conditions to maintain safe operations.

Operators should note that this is not a Focused Inspection Campaign (FIC) or Concentrated Inspection Campaign (CIC) of limited duration. It is a sustained focus on an identified area of concern that is part of AMSA’s data driven and risk-based approach to our PSC inspection regime. 

Further reading

Recommendation 74 A Guide to managing maintenance in accordance with the requirements of the ISM Code- Rev.2 Aug 2018 (International Association of Classification Societies). Accessed https://iacs.org.uk/resolutions/recommendations

Purpose

This Marine Notice provides guidance about risks associated with the operation of engine power limiters (EPL) and similar power restriction systems onboard ships transiting Australian compulsory coastal pilotage areas. 

Guidance is provided for

• Ship operators
• Masters
• Officers in Charge of a Navigation Watch (OICNW)
• AMSA-licensed coastal pilots

Background

The shipping industry is making changes to improve the energy efficiency of ships and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. These changes will help deliver the targets outlined in the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) revised strategy on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions from ships and ensure compliance with the associated requirements in Marine Order 97 for:   

• Energy Efficiency Ship Index (EEXI)
• Carbon Intensity Indicator (CII)

Ships may be fitted with the following power restriction/limiting systems to meet these requirements:

• shaft power limitation systems (ShaPoLi)
• EPL (which use load limiting / automated acceleration limiting software programs)
• permanent de-rating of engines to limit the power of the ship. 

The use of power limiting systems must not limit the effectiveness and safety of the ship to operate in accordance with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS), including safe speed requirements.

Whilst power limiting systems are used to ensure compliance with EEXI and CII, immediate access to the full power range of the main engine by overriding the power limiting system may be necessary:

• to ensure safe navigation through Australia’s compulsory coastal pilotage areas
• if requested by the attending coastal pilot
• in areas of strong tidal influence
• in an emergency.

The IMO has recently amended the ShaPoLi and EPL guidelines to ensure sufficient information is available to marine pilots about these systems when they have the con of the ship. These amendments are available here. Owners and operators must be familiar with the guidelines and make any necessary changes as a result of these amendments.

To ensure safe navigation and environmental protection in Australian coastal pilotage areas, AMSA seeks to address this risk in accordance with this Marine Notice.

Requirements for ship operators, masters and OICNW

SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 34, via the cascading requirements found in IMO Resolution A.893(21), requires voyage planning to take into consideration:

• ship manoeuvring characteristics
• known navigation hazards
• environmental conditions.

Accordingly, engine limiting devices should be considered as part of the voyage planning appraisal, including when considering:

• frequency of course
• speed changes necessary
• duration of transits in restricted waters
• whether an override may be required during operation in confined waters.

Operators of ships with an engine limiting device installed are expected to indicate this in their:

• pilot cards
• wheelhouse poster
• manoeuvring booklet.

It is also a requirement under the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code) that a risk assessment is in place that would consider immediate access to override an EPL when the ship’s full manoeuvrability is required to ensure safe passage. Hence, AMSA’s expectation is that such a risk assessment be in place and available upon request when navigating through the Australian coastal pilotage areas.

Masters and OICNW should be familiar with any load limiting or automatic acceleration limiting devices fitted onboard the ship and be familiar with the operation of their overrides.

Ships are expected to be able to answer all engine and helm commands provided by a pilot at all times while underway in a coastal pilotage area.

Pre-boarding requirements for coastal pilots and pilotage providers

Pilots should be familiar with the changing environment in which they operate. The addition of ShaPoLi or EPL to ships means that pilots may need to adapt their approach to coastal pilotage.

Pilotage providers should ensure that their Master-Pilot Exchange (MPX) process specifically includes a requirement for the pilot to verify the existence (and potential limitations) of any EPL (or similar power limitation arrangement) onboard, prior to the pilot taking the con.

Pilotage providers should obtain (at least) the following information as part of the pre-boarding communication with the ship / operator:

• Is the ship equipped with an engine or shaft power limiter? If yes, is the limiter mechanical or software based?
• If the ship is equipped with a mechanical limiter, will it be removed or disabled prior to the pilot boarding the ship?
• If the ship is equipped with a software-based limiter, will the ship’s crew be able to override it immediately at the request of the pilot?
• Can the main engine/s attain the posted manoeuvring power (RPMs) without delay?
• Are the master and all bridge navigatioaal watchkeepers familiar with the override feature for the EPL (if fitted)? 
• Does the vessel have a risk assessment with appropriate control measures in place for immediate access to the EPL when full manoeuvrability is needed for safe passage?

Based on the responses to the questions above, the pilotage provider and the assigned pilot should decide if they need to conduct a targeted risk assessment of the planned passage before boarding. This will determine if the ship's manoeuvrability presents a significant risk to the conduct of a safe passage noting the expected environmental factors and the scheduled timing of the passage.

If the pilotage provider’s risk assessment indicates the ship’s manoeuvrability presents a significant risk, the provider should consider implementing extra control measures like weather, tidal and/or timing restrictions to address the risk.

The pilotage provider should notify AMSA immediately (via email to coastal.pilotage@amsa.gov.au) if:

• the pilot card onboard the ship does not reflect the existence of an EPL (or similar arrangement), where such a system exists; and/or any additional controls are intended to be implemented after a risk assessment is conducted for any particular voyage.

Further reading

Further information about shaft / engine power limitation systems can be found in the following IMO references:

• MEPC.335(76) – 2021 Guidelines on the shaft / engine power limitation system to comply with the EEXI requirements and use of a power reserve
• MEPC.390(81) – Amendments to the 2021 guidelines on the shaft / engine power limitation system to comply with the EEXI requirements and use of a power reserve (Resolution MEPC.335(76)), as amended by Resolution MEPC.375(80))

Purpose

A reminder of the requirements to test and maintain fuel isolation valves for multi-engine installations.

Reminder for

• Ship owners
• Operators
• Masters
• Engineers
• Recognised Organisations

Background

We have seen an increase in the failure of remotely operated isolation valves in the fuel supply lines to generators.

This notice is issued as general guidance only. Read with SOLAS II-2 Regulation 4.2 and MSC.1/Circ.1321.

Oil fuel piping

In the event of a fire on a generator, the fuel must be isolated to a single engine, without affecting the operation of other engines.

“In multi-engine installations which are supplied from the same fuel source, means of isolating the fuel supply and spill piping to individual engines, shall be provided. The means of isolation shall not affect the operation of the other engines and shall be operable from a position not rendered inaccessible by a fire on any of the engines.”

Source: SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 4.2

MSC.1/Circ.1321, issued June 2009 describes how to implement this.

One common solution is to install a quick closing valve on the fuel supply line to the engine between the fuel change over valves and the engine with a remote actuator in another part of the machinery space.

For ships built after June 2009, where possible the valves or the actuator for the remote closing valves should be at least 5m from the engine in any direction. Where this is not possible, protection by obstructions may be implemented.

Testing

Ship operators must have procedures to ensure that a ship is maintained. This includes the function of the isolation valves.

Source: Paragraph 10.1 of Part A of the International Safety Management Code (ISM)

Regularly test equipment that is not in continuous use, to promote reliability.

Source: Paragraph 10.3 of the ISM Code

Defective Quick Closing valve remaining in the open position after actuator is triggered to close the valve

Inspections

Port State control inspections can include testing quick-closing valves on a ships fuel system. This may include the remote operation of the fuel supply isolation valves.

Crew should be familiar with the remote operation of the valves, the reset procedures and how to ensure the valves are  maintained in good working order.

A ship may be detained, if the remote quick-closing devices are:

• absent
• non-compliant
• substantially deteriorated to the extent that the remote quick-closing devices will not work if needed.

SOLAS II-2 Regulation 4.2

This Marine Notice only provides a summary of one aspect of SOLAS II-2 Regulation 4.2. Refer to SOLAS, the MSC Resolution or the IMO procedures for port State control. SOLAS II-2 is implemented in Australia by Marine Order 15.

Background

The IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) has released recommendations aimed at reducing the risk of a plastic pellet spill during their carriage in freight containers by sea.

The recommendations contain guidance for the packaging, identification and stowage of plastic pellets when held in freight containers during maritime transport.  

Shippers, manufacturers, terminal operators, shipowners, ship operators, charterers, shipmasters and all relevant parties are encouraged to take up these recommendations.  

Packaging recommendations

It is recommended that plastic pellets be packed in good quality packaging that is strong enough to withstand the shocks and loadings normally encountered during transport. Packaging should also be constructed and closed to prevent any loss of contents which may be caused under normal conditions of transport by vibration or acceleration forces.

Identification recommendations

In addition to the cargo information required by SOLAS regulation VI/2, transport information should clearly identify freight containers that contain plastic pellets. The shipper should include a special stowage request consistent with the stowage recommendations.

Stowage recommendations

Freight containers holding plastic pellets should be properly stowed and secured to minimise the hazards to the marine environment without impairing the safety of the ship and persons on board.  

Specifically, containers should be stowed:

• Under deck wherever reasonably practicable; or
• Inboard in sheltered areas of exposed decks.  

Future mandatory measures

These recommendations are the first step in a 2-stage approach to address the environmental risks associated with the maritime transport of plastic pellets. The MEPC will consider appropriate mandatory measures as the second step.  

These mandatory measures will be informed by the experience gained from the implementation of the recommendations. To assist in these discussions, feedback on the implementation of the recommendations would be welcome by email to: Environment.Standards@amsa.gov.au

Further information  

A copy of MEPC.1/Circ.909 setting out these recommendations can be obtained from the IMO Website.

Purpose

This marine notice informs ship operators and recognised organisations of AMSA’s interpretation for the installation and testing of oil filtering equipment (oily water separators) installed on ships.

Oil filtering equipment installed on a ship on or after 1 January 2005 must be approved to meet Resolution MEPC.107(49) to comply with MARPOL Annex I Regulation 14. 

The requirements include;

• a truly representative sample of the effluent with adequate pressure and flow is supplied to the 15ppm bilge alarm (6.2.2).
• provision of fail-safe arrangements to avoid any discharge in case of malfunction of the 15ppm bilge alarm (4.1.3).
• 15ppm bilge alarm is fitted with an electronic device that is pre-set to activate when the effluent exceeds 15ppm and operates automatically if at any time the 15ppm bilge alarm should fail to function (4.2.7).
• the response time of the 15ppm bilge alarm. This is the time that elapses between an alteration in the sample being supplied to the 15ppm bilge alarm and the ppm display showing the correct response. Response time should not exceed 5 seconds (4.2.6).
• the setup of the installation must minimise the time it takes for the system to respond when the discharge from the 15ppm bilge separator exceeds 15ppm. This includes the time it takes for the automatic stopping device to activate and prevent discharge into the water. This should take less than 20 seconds. It must not exceed that limit under any circumstances (as per section 6.2.1).

MEPC. 107(49) Installation arrangement

AMSA PSC procedure

AMSA port State control officers (PSCOs) will inspect the condition, and operation, of the oily-water separator, filtering equipment and alarm, stopping or monitoring arrangements as described in the Procedures for Port State Control, 2023 Resolution A.1185(33).

Operational testing of oil filtering equipment will require the equipment to be configured to circulate liquid from bilge tank to bilge tank (recirculating facility) and provide an effluent sample to the 15ppm bilge alarm – simulating the discharge of 15ppm bilge separator effluent overboard. When a simulation of effluent sample greater than 15ppm is applied, the PSCO will confirm that the alarm is activated, and that the automatic stopping device (3-way valve) stops effluent discharge overboard. This indicates compliant operation of the system.

The PSCO will confirm that there is a flow of effluent sample from the 15ppm bilge separator that is truly representative, with adequate pressure and flow, to the 15ppm bilge alarm while effluent is being simulated to flow overboard.

In cases where the flow of effluent sample is not a representative sample, including blockage of the sample line or incorrect operation of valves, it is expected that, in accordance with MEPC.107(49) requirements, the fail-safe arrangement will activate the automatic stopping device (3-way valve) and stop effluent discharge overboard.

AMSA’s interpretation is that the failure of the 15ppm bilge alarm to activate the automatic stopping device in the absence of a representative sample of the effluent, represents non- compliance with Resolution MEPC.107(49). That is there is no fail-safe arrangement required by technical specification 4.1.3.

Figures 2 and 3 show a sample line found blocked when no flow observed from 15ppm bilge alarm outlet.

AMSA is aware various classification societies advocate for the installation of “flow sensors” in the 15ppm bilge alarm sample line. The flow sensors activate an alarm and operate the automatic stopping arrangements when a truly representative sample, with adequate pressure and flow, is not present at the 15ppm bilge alarm. They also recommend the sealing of all valves installed in the effluent sample pipes so that the valves are locked and sealed in their normal operating position to ensure adequate effluent sampling.

AMSA accepts that MEPC 107(49) does not specifically require the fitting of flow or pressure sensors.

The above figures 4 and 5 show a flow sensor and alarm fitted to the 15ppm bilge alarm sample line.

Considerations during testing

The following sets out AMSA’s considerations when testing oily water separators during port state control inspection with respect to two types of systems approved under MEPC 107(49):

1. MEPC 107(49) approved system that is fitted with an effluent sample flow sensor to 15ppm bilge alarm.

Operational testing of the equipment is performed by stopping the sample water flow to the 15ppm bilge alarm. If the 15ppm bilge alarm does not alarm when effluent sample flow is stopped for more than 5 seconds, and the automatic stopping device is not activated within 20 seconds, this is considered a failure of the oily discharge monitoring and control system and the 15ppm alarm arrangements. The ship is likely to be detained until the system complies with MARPOL requirements.

2. MEPC 107(49) approved system that is not fitted with an effluent sample flow sensor to the 15ppm bilge alarm.

The sample water flow through 15ppm bilge alarm should be unobstructed. All valve(s) fitted for sampling line to the 15ppm bilge alarm should be in the normal operating position when testing is performed during port state control inspections. During the test the following will be considered:

• If operational testing of the equipment commences with effluent sample valves open, this is evidence of the system being used correctly in service. If there is no 15ppm bilge alarm and automatic stopping device activation after shutting the effluent sample valve, then the equipment is non-compliant. The equipment must be made compliant. As a temporary measure, valves to and from 15ppm bilge alarm can be secured and sealed open to ensure the flow of effluent sample cannot be stopped or manipulated whilst the equipment is operating, as required by MEPC 107(49) 4.2.10.1.
• If operational testing of the equipment commences with the effluent sample valve shut or no flow of effluent sample possible through the 15ppm bilge alarm and the automatic stopping device does not activate, this is viewed as evidence that wilful manipulation of the equipment is possible. As pollution of the environment may occur, the ship is likely to be detained until the equipment complies and crew are sufficiently familiar with the operation of the system.
• If operational testing of the equipment commences with the effluent sample valve closed and with clean water, used for cleaning or calibration, flowing through the 15ppm bilge alarm and the automatic stopping device does not activate, then the equipment is non-compliant to MEPC 107(49) 4.2.10.2. The ship may be considered for detention until the equipment complies and crew are sufficiently familiar with the operation of the system.

Guidelines

MEPC 107(49) – Resolution MEPC 107(49)

Background 

Due to increasing concerns with the impacts of underwater radiated noise (URN) from commercial shipping on marine life, the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) has released a revised version of the guidelines for the reduction of URN from shipping, following a comprehensive review.

The revised guidelines provide updated design, technical, operational and maintenance guidance to reduce URN, which are applicable to shipbuilders, designers and operators. They are intended to be applied to new and existing ships, taking into account the ship’s design and construction, as well as its operations.

The revised guidelines also include updated international measurement standards, recommendations and classification society rules for the evaluation and monitoring of URN, which will assist in assessing the effectiveness of efforts to reduce URN.

URN management planning

The revised guidelines contain a new section on URN management planning, which should be considered at the earliest stages of design for new builds, and as far as reasonably practicable for existing ships. This includes the development of a URN management plan, intended to be a flexible tool that allows a customised approach. The management plan may include establishing a baseline URN, setting URN targets, and evaluating various technological, operational, and maintenance approaches to reduce URN. Model templates in the revised guidelines help shipowners and designers in this process. 

Energy efficiency and URN

Recognising efforts to achieve increased energy efficiency in ships may also result in a reduction in URN, a dedicated section has been included in the revised guidelines on positive synergies with climate policies. This section notes however that URN measures should not come at the expense of efforts to reduce GHG emissions from ships or other IMO measures associated with ship safety. 

Incentive schemes

Incentive schemes are encouraged to support URN reduction efforts and monitoring. Such schemes could be linked to URN ship class notations, recognition of URN management plans, URN reduction targets, innovative ship and engine technologies and maintenance practices, ship speed optimisation programs, and voluntary sustainability certifications, which include evidence of URN reduction. Examples include discounts on port dues, fairway fees, extra services, or promotional benefits. 

Further information 

A copy of MEPC.1/Circ.906 setting out these revised guidelines can be obtained from the IMO website.  

Please note the above circular revokes MEPC.1/Circ.833. 

This notice is issued as general information only. AMSA will issue a formal Direction to each cruise vessel as required. 

This marine notice supersedes marine notice 06/2018.

Directions

AMSA is issuing directions that require cruise vessels berthing in Sydney Harbour that can accommodate more than 100 passengers, to limit sulphur emissions by using low sulphur fuel or an alternative measure that achieves an equivalent outcome. The vessel may use: 

• fuel with a sulphur content not exceeding 0.10% mass per cent concentration (0.10% m/m), or 
• an exhaust gas cleaning system, certified and approved in accordance with the International Maritime Organization Guidelines for Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems, or 
• a power source external to the vessel, or 
• a combination of any of the above measures. 

The limit on sulphur emissions applies from one hour after the vessel’s arrival at berth until one hour before the vessel’s departure. 

Compliance 

AMSA issues Directions under subsection 246(1)(b) of the Navigation Act 2012.  

AMSA requires masters and operators to comply with such Directions. The penalties for not complying are substantial. 

AMSA may take into consideration the specific circumstances that exist if the Direction cannot be met, due to: 

• unforeseen and uncontrolled mechanical or equipment failure 
• the unavailability of compliant fuel 
• unexpected delays in departure beyond the reasonable control of the master 
• an unscheduled berthing due to an emergency.  

In any of the above circumstances, AMSA must be notified, and should be provided with the following information as soon as practicable: 

• details of the circumstances that may result, or have resulted in the vessel being unable to comply 
• the likely duration of non-compliance and steps being taken to comply 
• the sulphur content of the fuel being used or proposed to be used. 

This document does not constitute legal advice and is not a substitute for independent professional advice.