Recent events have clearly identified the serious risk when stability of a vessel is inadequately calculated, in particular the potential for a loss of stability and subsequent risk of capsize.

Discussion

Section 11(1) of Marine Order 43 (Cargo and cargo handling—livestock) 2018 (Marine Order 43) requires the master of a livestock vessel to ensure the vessel complies with the Intact Stability Code and the criteria in Schedule 1 of this Order at all stages of the voyage and during loading of the vessel.

To ensure the master is provided with the appropriate information to calculate the stability of the vessel, Section 13(2) of Marine Order 43 requires the person (the shipper) provide accurate details of the number, weight, and kind of livestock to be loaded on to a vessel. Failure to do so is an offence.

Furthermore, Regulation 2 of Chapter VI of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) requires a shipper to provide the master with ‘appropriate information on the cargo, sufficiently in advance of loading, to enable precautions which may be necessary for proper stowage and safe carriage of the cargo to be put into effect’.

These requirements are adopted through Marine Order 42 (Carriage, stowage and securing of cargoes and containers) and compliance means the ‘proper precautions’ that a master must take includes the development of a detailed load plan for the vessel.

A shipper must not provide average livestock weights across the entire load, as this does not provide the master with sufficient information to appropriately calculate the vessel’s stability.

The information provided by the shipper must be sufficient to allow the master to create a detailed deck-by-deck load plan addressing animal type, weight, and number in order to assess compliance with Part A of the Intact Stability Code and Schedule 1 of Marine Order 43.

AMSA Pre-load inspections

During pre-load inspections, AMSA inspectors will confirm that the information provided to the master prior to loading enables the master to produce:

• a detailed deck-by-deck load plan addressing animal type, weight, and number of animals, and
• a stability calculation that shows that the vessel will comply with the relevant stability requirements throughout the entire voyage.

These measures are necessary to accurately calculate the vessel’s stability and to comply with Section 11(1) of Marine Order 43.

If such information has not been provided— and/or the master cannot produce the plan or calculations—loading of livestock will be prohibited under Section 17 of Marine Order 43 until the requirements are met.

It should be noted that a person may be liable to a civil penalty if the person contravenes Sections 11(1) or 13(2) of the Order.

Download Pre-loading cargo information for livestock vessels—marine notice 2018/5 (PDF 334 KB) PDF333.65 KB

Gary Prosser
Deputy CEO
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Supersedes 14/2013

As a Party to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Australia must ensure that reception facilities are available in ports and terminals, adequate to receive all waste streams that are generated on board a ship during normal operations as a result of the ship’s compliance with MARPOL, including the following:

• oil, oily waste, oily mixtures, oily bilge water, slops, sludge, oily tank washings, oily cargo residues, ballast water containing oily mixtures;
• cargo hold washings containing residues of noxious liquid substances carried in bulk;
• sewage;
• garbage, as defined in MARPOL Annex V, including dry/bulk cargo residues and cargo-associated waste (such as dunnage and packaging); and
• ozone depleting substances and exhaust gas cleaning residues.

Arranging for waste reception

Information on arranging for waste reception may be accessed online. Contact points for Australian ports can be accessed through the Port Reception Facilities database within the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) http://gisis.imo.org/Public/. 

Ships’ crews and agents are encouraged to make waste reception arrangements as far as possible in advance of the ship’s arrival in port, noting that specific service providers’ requirements may vary. The IMO has developed a standard format for the advance notification of waste delivery to port reception facilities for the use of ships’ crews and agents. This form can be found at Appendix 2 to Circular MEPC.1/Circ.834 - Consolidated guidance for port reception facility providers and users.

Following a ships’ use of port reception facilities, the ships’ crews and agents should encourage waste reception facilities service providers to use the IMO standard format for the waste delivery receipt as outlined at Appendix 3 to Circular MEPC.1/834.

The use of the standard advance notification form and waste delivery receipt are not mandatory, however, the use of these forms can simplify documentation for ships visiting multiple ports. If these forms are not used, ships’ crews, agents and waste reception facilities service providers should endeavour to provide equivalent information in alternative documentation.

Reporting inadequacies

Where a ship’s Master or agent finds reception facilities in a port inadequate (for example the facility required is not available or is inconveniently located, has unreasonable charges and/or causes undue delay) the Master should communicate all relevant details using the IMO format for reporting alleged inadequacies of port reception facilities as outlined at Appendix 1 to MEPC.1/Circ.834.

The report should be forwarded to the vessels’ flag State and a copy sent to AMSA (as the port State authority) at the following address:

General Manager 
Standards 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
GPO Box 2181 Canberra ACT 2601

StandardsEnvironment@amsa.gov.au

Notification should be made as soon as possible. AMSA will investigate the report with the relevant port and provide information on the outcome of the investigation to the IMO and the flag State.

Guide to best practice

The IMO has developed a Guide to good practice for port reception facility providers and users. This Guide is provided at the Annex to Circular MEPC.1/Circ.834 and is intended to be a practical users’ guide for ships’ crews who seek to deliver MARPOL wastes ashore and for port reception facility providers who seek to provide timely and efficient port reception facilities for ships.
Ships’ crews, agents, port authorities and waste service providers are strongly encouraged to apply best practice as described within the Guide wherever possible.

Shipping companies are also urged to include the information in this Marine Notice in the procedures to be followed by ships’ Masters for shipboard operations as required under Section 7 of the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution Prevention (ISM Code).

Copies of Circular MEPC.1/Circ.834 can be obtained from the IMO website or by contacting StandardsEnvironment@amsa.gov.au.

Please note that this Marine Notice is not intended to constitute legal advice and should not be relied on for that purpose.

Download Ensuring adequate waste reception facilities—marine notice 5/2016 (PDF 56 KB) PDF55.63 KB

Gary Prosser 
Deputy Chief Executive Officer 
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
January 2016

GPO Box 2181 
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Serious incident

A seafarer suffered serious injury while conducting routine maintenance work on part of a 13 bar high-pressure fire-fighting system on a fire-fighting tug. 

Prior to the incident, maintenance on the manifold on the other side of the vessel had been completed without incident. As a result, it was assumed that the system was not pressurised.

Note: The hydrant in question is closest to the camera. Click on the image to make larger.

The seafarer was attempting to remove the brass blanking cap from a hydrant valve on a manifold of four valves fitted in parallel. The other three valves had been satisfactorily checked 10 minutes earlier.

The seafarer could not release the locking pawl by hand and, assuming that it was seized, utilised multigrips to free it. The line was under pressure and when the 600 gram blanking cap came free it was expelled under pressure and struck the seafarer in the face causing severe facial injuries.

Factors contributing to the incident

An investigation into the incident concluded that the following factors may have contributed:

• Inadequate safe work procedures for working on high pressure systems.
• Incomplete closure of both the butterfly isolating valve to the manifold and the hydrant valve allowed air to pass the valve seat and become trapped under pressure in the hydrant chamber.
• Lack of 3mm pressure relief holes in the hydrant blanking cap as specified in AS 2419.2-2009.
• Use of heavy brass hydrant blanking caps rather than lightweight alternatives.
• Turning directions for opening and closing of hydrant isolating valve were non-standard and opposite to that shown on the valve control.
• Isolating valve indicator was unclear and positioned out of operator’s line of sight.

This incident could have been prevented through effective controls, however, the provision of pressure relief and securing arrangements for the cap would have protected the seafarer where those controls were ineffective.

Recommendations

The Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) notes that SOLAS does not require pressure relief holes in blanking caps. However, AMSA strongly recommends that the requirement for 3mm pressure relief holes in hydrant blanking caps, as specified in AS 2419.2-2009—fire hydrant installations, be complied with.

Blanking caps are also available in a lightweight plastic composite material, which would significantly reduce impact forces should all other controls fail. AMSA supports the use of lightweight alternatives where appropriate.

AMSA also recommends the fitting of securing chains or wires to blanking caps as specified in AS 2419.2-2009—fire hydrant installations. This is designed to prevent the loss of the cap.

Note: the lightweight blanking cap shown above is fitted with a pressure relief hole and a securing chain.

Conclusion

Even where pressure relief arrangements are in place shipowners, operators, masters, and crew are reminded to exercise care when operating with, and working on, any fire-fighting systems. Perform the necessary checks described in the vessel’s safety management system to ensure that no part of the system is pressurised before working on it.

Download High pressure fire-fighting systems—Design safeguards against personal injury marine notice 2018/4 (PDF 285 KB) PDF284.34 KB

Gary Prosser
Deputy CEO
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Known issues

Marine Order 30 (Prevention of collisions) gives effect to the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS) and applies to all commercial and recreational vessels. Annex IV of the COLREGS lists the distress signals which are to be used to indicate if a vessel is in distress and requires assistance. This list does not include EVDS. 

The National Standard for Commercial Vessels (NSCV) details the requirements for the construction, production and performance requirements for safety equipment. Under the NSCV, EVDS are not an approved means of distress signal.

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS) describes the standards that distress alerting equipment should meet and in Australia, AS 2092-2004 (Australian Standard for Pyrotechnic marine distress flares and signals for pleasure craft) sets the requirements for these devices. 

EVDS are not an internationally or domestically approved distress signal and it is likely that, if seen, they may not be recognised as a distress signal in the event of a distress situation.

Considerations 

To be effective, distress signals need to be recognised. EVDS devices are not compliant with the SOLAS Convention or Australia’s technical performance standards for distress flares. The international carriage requirements do not recognise EVDS and Australia’s national carriage requirements have not been amended to recognise them.

Tests conducted in Australia in 2017 indicate that the EVDS was not recognisable as a distress alert when seen. This reinforces that EVDS devices should not be used in place of a pyrotechnic flare. 

As all vessels are required to comply with the COLREGS, distress signals carried should comply with either the SOLAS or the Australian standard. 

AMSA will continue to monitor the development of EVDS and will consider changes to this Marine Notice when the standards and benefits are consistent with pyrotechnic flares.

Gary Prosser
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

The purpose of this marine notice is to bring to the attention of ship owners, ship operators, ship masters, port authorities, and tug operators the dangers of using weighted heaving lines when transferring mooring lines to tugs and shore linespersons.

Concerns with the use of weighted heaving lines

Recently, AMSA has received a number of complaints about the use of monkey fists on heaving lines that contain weights. These incidents resulted in near misses to personnel on tugs and had the potential to damage wheelhouse windows.

Such incidents can cause serious injury or a fatality to crew members and linespersons and/or damage to the vessel.

The incidents

During the berthing of a vessel at Hay Point, metal objects in lieu of a monkey’s fist were attached to the messenger line for securing to tug towlines. This metal object landed heavily on the tug’s deck, narrowly missing the deck crew.

In another incident, a tug attending the berthing of a ship at Newcastle had a heaving line thrown by the ship’s crew which narrowly missed the Engineer and Deckhand. A heavy weight, consisting of a large rusty shackle, was used on this occasion. 

A tug attending the berthing of a ship at Dalrymple Bay had a weighted monkey fist land heavily on the deck of the tug narrowly missing the deck crew.

Some weights are dipped in paint to increase the weight. This practice is also dangerous.

Many similar incidents have been reported elsewhere. Safety Alert 12 from the West of England Insurance Service is relevant.

The above examples are of the weights found added to a monkey’s fist.

Best practice guidance

There are dangers involved in using heaving lines which incorporate weights in the monkey’s fist. The risk of injury to tug crews and linesmen is very high and the ensuing injuries potentially extremely serious.

A number of seamanship publications provide instruction on the correct tying of a monkey’s fist or heaving-line knot to weight the end of a heaving line. This knot must be made of rope only.

The Code of Safe Working Practice for Merchant Seafarers section 26.3.5 provides more information.

AMSA recommends that all ships crews are cautioned about the dangers of inappropriately weighting heaving lines. Owners and Operators are encouraged to ensure proper procedures for heaving lines are included in the Safety Management System. The continued cooperation of all owners, operators and masters is appreciated in order to avoid future incidents of this nature.

Download Danger with the use of weighted heaving lines—marine notice 18/2016 (PDF 301 KB) PDF300.78 KB

Gary Prosser
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
October 2016

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601  

This marine notice alerts the maritime industry to findings of two recent accident investigations conducted by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and the New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TIAC). These investigations have highlighted ongoing safety issues related to free-fall lifeboats and identified maintenance issues that the maritime industry should be aware of.

The incidents

Aquarosa (IMO No. 9506708) - On 1 March 2014, Aquarosa’s free-fall lifeboat was inadvertently released during a routine maintenance inspection while the ship was en route to Fremantle, Western Australia. One crew member was injured in the incident and it took 5 hours for the crew to recover the lifeboat.

Aquarosa’s Free-fall Lifeboat arrangement

Da Dan Xia (IMO No. 9451290) - On 14 April 2014, the wire lifting sling for the ship’s free-fall lifeboat failed catastrophically during recovery of the lifeboat after a routine launching exercise in Wellington, New Zealand. This resulted in the lifeboat falling several metres into harbour waters. One crew member was injured, and the lifeboat launching davit was rendered unserviceable.

Incident analysis – Aquarosa

The ATSB identified that the Second Engineer accidentally activated the lifeboat’s on-load release mechanism while carrying out a test procedure. When the Second Engineer cycled the hydraulic system, the retaining hook was released allowing the lifeboat to move down the launch ramp.

The ATSB found that the hydrostatic on-load release mechanism hydraulic cylinder ram had not fully retracted after use, preventing the stopper block from resetting correctly. This left the release hook in a partially disengaged position.

The ATSB noted that the design of the release mechanism cover plate prevented visual confirmation that the hook was correctly reset.

Aquarosa’s free-fall lifeboat release system

The lifeboat was fitted with simulation wires to prevent it from launching under these circumstances. However, on this occasion, the simulation wires failed allowing the lifeboat to move down the guide rails into the sea. The ATSB found that the simulation wires failed due to a combination of incorrect installation and cumulative internal wear from numerous shock loading events that resulted from previous lifeboat launching drills.

Incident analysis – Da Dan Xia

TAIC identified that the wire pennants parted under tensile overload. Subsequent testing confirmed that the sling wires had been significantly weakened by severe corrosion. This corrosion had gone undetected inside a plastic sheathing that the manufacturer had fitted to the wire.
The sheathing prevented the crew from identifying the corrosion and did not allow for lubrication or the application of other corrosion-inhibiting substances. The crew were also unaware of the necessity for greater vigilance and the application of anticorrosive substances during inspections.

Examples of the damage to Da Dan Xia’s wire slings after failure (Courtesy TAIC)

TAIC found that the wires were of adequate strength when manufactured, but that the sheathing allowed saltwater ingress, aiding corrosion by retaining water, and prevented external observation.

IMO Convention requirements

Chapter III, Regulation 20 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requires operational readiness, maintenance, and inspection of lifeboats and rescue boats. Under applicable Australian law, owners and operators are responsible for implementing effective routines and procedures that meet SOLAS requirements. These incidents reinforce the need to ensure effective implementation of these processes.

On board safety management

AMSA continues to observe numerous defects and deficiencies related to ship’s lifeboats and life rafts. This is difficult to understand given the IMO and AMSA focus on risks associated with the incorrect operation and maintenance of survival craft.
Wire failure was the critical factor in both the Aquarosa and Da Dan Xia incidents. This highlights the importance of:

• Ships’ crews following established maintenance procedures and being vigilant and observant during all maintenance tasks.
• The examination of maintenance procedures to ensure they are effective.
• Effective crew familiarization and training, to minimise risk when crew are conducting test procedures and training drills.

AMSA inspections

Marine Notice 2/2014 highlighted the requirement for additional restraints to be installed on lifeboats during AMSA inspections. This requirement is a control mechanism that AMSA has implemented to reduce the AMSA inspector’s exposure to risk. It is recommended that these restraints be used anytime maintenance is being carried out on lifeboats. The continued cooperation of all owners, operators and masters is appreciated.

More information regarding the details of each investigation can be found at: 

Transport Accident Investigation Commission [TAIC]

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Download Free-fall lifeboat safety—marine notice 15/2015 (PDF 202 KB) PDF201.18 KB

Gary Prosser
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601
August 2015

The purpose of this marine notice is to bring to the attention of vessel owners, operators, masters, port authorities, terminal operators and persons boarding and disembarking vessels the potential hazards and risks associated with accommodation ladders rigged with unapproved or inadequate secondary means of support arrangements.

Marine Order 12 (Construction – subdivision and stability, machinery and electrical installations) 2016 (MO 12) provides regulation for access to vessels in port.

The master of a vessel is required by section 24 of MO 12 to ensure that the means of access complies with certain requirements. Section 23 of MO 12 requires persons boarding or leaving a vessel to use the means of access provided or identified by the master.

SOLAS regulation II-1/3-9 references the means of embarkation and disembarkation ships and MSC.1/Circ1331 provides guidelines for the construction, maintenance and inspection /survey of means of embarkation and disembarkation.

Although there are no requirements under MO 12 or SOLAS regulation II-1/3-9 for the rigging of secondary means of support to accommodation ladders and no standards in MSC.1/Circ1331 for the construction, maintenance and operational testing of those arrangements AMSA notes that rigging of a secondary means of support to accommodation ladders, particularly where the accommodation ladder is suspended, has become common practice in some Australian ports.

Accommodation ladder secondary means of support arrangements

AMSA has observed that secondary means of support arrangements have consisted of:

• steel wire, synthetic or natural fibre ropes tied or otherwise connected to the accommodation ladder and a part of the vessel’s structure;
• synthetic or natural fibre rope roved through pulley blocks and connected to the accommodation ladder hoisting arrangements or part of vessel’s structure;
• Steel chains or wire ropes with or without a bridle connected to a part of the vessel’s structure or suspended from the vessel’s stores crane or bunker hose davit.

Hazards associated with accommodation ladders rigged with unapproved or inadequate secondary means of support

AMSA has noted in many cases that the secondary means of support arrangements are inadequate for their intended purpose and in fact introduce unacceptable hazards and risks.

Some secondary means of support arrangements have been found to have inadequate load bearing capacity because:

• they are connected to vessel’s cranes or davits with insufficient SWL;
• they are fixed to non-load bearing parts of the accommodation ladder and vessel structure;
• the tensile strength of ropes, wires, pullies and fittings is inadequate.

Unapproved secondary means of support tied to non-loading bearing part of accommodation ladder and vessel structure

Some arrangements are not easily adjustable and add a further risk to safety when the accommodation ladder is lowered or raised to compensate for draught changes or due to tidal variation.

There are often no policies, procedures or instructions contained in the safety management system for the use and maintenance of the secondary means of support arrangements and crew have been unable to demonstrate proficiency in the use of these arrangements.  

Incidents and accidents involving secondary means of support arrangements

A seaman suffered a serious eye injury after being struck in the face by a natural fibre rope, which was being used as a secondary means of support. The seaman was lowering the accommodation ladder but neglected to disconnect the rope, which parted under the weight of the accommodation ladder and recoiled violently.

Parted wire from unapproved secondary means of support

There has been several incidents reported to AMSA of the accommodation ladder being rigged so as to be supported by only a secondary means of support while persons were embarking or disembarking.

In one case a person on the accommodation ladder was nearly pitched into the sea when it became very unstable as a result of not being supported by the appropriate hoisting wires. 

The hoisting wire of a davit crane, which was being utilised as a secondary means of support, parted while ship’s crew were lowering the accommodation ladder to allow a draught surveyor to embark. The davit crane section of parted wire, block hook, the bridle and wire ropes fell onto the accommodation ladder.

In all the above examples the secondary means of support were inadequate to support the weight of the accommodation ladder and therefore only introduced hazards while not providing an additional safety measure.

AMSA position on accommodation secondary means of support arrangements

AMSA does not require the fitting of secondary means of support to accommodation ladders and encourages vessel owners, operators and masters to seek advice from their Administration prior to fitting such arrangements.

AMSA does not object, in principle, to a secondary means of support that is properly designed and fit for purpose. A risk assessment of any secondary means of support arrangements should be undertaken onboard according to the vessel’s safety management system.

Procedures for the fitting, maintenance and operation of the secondary means of support arrangements should be included in safety management system procedures and crew should be inducted and trained in the use of these arrangements.

AMSA will take action as appropriate where such arrangements are in place and are found to pose a safety risk.

Download Ship accommodation ladders with unapproved secondary means of support arrangements—marine notice 13/2017 (PDF 88 KB) PDF87.71 KB

shGary Prosser
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
November 2017

GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Use of Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems in Australian waters

The use of an EGCS is permitted in Australian waters as an option to comply with the low sulphur fuel requirements of MARPOL Annex VI, as set out in the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983, section 26FEGA, provided it is approved by the vessel’s flag State Administration, or a recognised organisation appointed by the flag State. The EGCS must also be operated in accordance with International Maritime Organization (IMO) requirements, including the 2021 Guidelines for Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems (resolution MEPC.340(77)).

Crew members must be properly trained in the use of the EGCS and the system must be kept in good working order, with maintenance up-to-date and monitoring devices fully operational. The EGCS approval documents as well as operational and maintenance records for the EGCS must be maintained on board the vessel and made available for inspection upon Port State Control Officer (PSCO) request.

Prior to being discharged into Australian waters, EGCS wash water must comply with discharge water quality criteria set out in the 2021 EGCS Guidelines. While there are no prohibitions on the discharge of wash water from EGCS in Australian waters, some port Authorities may encourage vessels to avoid discharging wash water within port limits.

EGCS malfunctions

If there is an EGCS malfunction2, action must be taken as soon as possible to identify and remedy the malfunction. Any EGCS malfunction that lasts more than one hour, or repetitive malfunctions, should be reported to the flag State Administration and Competent Authority of the port State of the vessel's destination. The report should include an explanation of the steps that are being taken to address the failure.

If the vessel’s EGCS cannot be returned to a compliant condition within one hour, the vessel must then change over to compliant fuel oil. If the vessel does not have sufficient compliant fuel oil to reach the next port of destination, the vessel will need to make a report to the relevant authorities, including the vessel’s flag State Administration and the Competent Authority for the next port of destination. The report must outline the vessel's proposed course of action, which might include bunkering compliant fuel oil at the next port or carrying out repair works. Where this occurs on an Australian vessel or a foreign vessel within Australian waters, this report should be sent to reports@amsa.gov.au.

Any EGCS found to be not in compliance with IMO guidelines in any respect (including but not limited to the discharge water quality criteria) may be prohibited from use in Australian waters.

Further information

Ship owners and operators should refer to Marine Notice 04/2019 for a summary of the MARPOL Annex VI low sulphur fuel requirements. Detailed requirements can be found in MARPOL Annex VI, the Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act 1983 and Marine Order 97 (Marine pollution prevention – air pollution).

This document does not constitute legal advice and is not a substitute for independent professional advice.

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

1. Refer to resolution MEPC.340(77) for further information.  
2. Refer to resolution MEPC.1/Circ.883/Rev.1 for further information.

The purpose of this marine notice is to draw to the attention of ship owners, operators, masters, officers, seafarer training organisations and industry organisations the importance of maintaining rescue boats in good working order ready for immediate use. This marine notice highlights operation and maintenance issues that the ship’s crew and operators should be aware of. 

Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) Port Sate control officers (PSCOs) are increasingly finding that some crew members are unfamiliar with the operation and maintenance of outboard motors.

A lack of understanding on how outboard motors are operated and maintained could result in poor performance, or total failure, of these motors. This is an unacceptable risk during a rescue operation that could have catastrophic consequences.

Rescue boats

A rescue boat is designed to rescue persons in distress and to marshal survival craft. Masters have the responsibility for ensuring that rescue boats and associated equipment are maintained in good working order at all times.

Rescue boats may be either of rigid or inflated construction or a combination of both and are fitted with an inboard engine or outboard motor. The most common type of propulsion system used for a rescue boat is a petrol driven outboard motor.

During recent Port State Control (PSC) inspections, AMSA PSCOs have identified rescue boat outboard motor operational and maintenance issues which are described below.

Cooling water

Outboard motor cooling water circulation is provided by a cooling water pump incorporating a rubber impeller and is confirmed during operation by a jet of water through a tell-tale hole located below the power head.

Outboard motors are not designed to be operated without cooling water, even for short periods of time, unlike inboard engines which are designed to be capable of operating for not less than 5 min after starting from cold with the lifeboat out of the water (International Life-Saving Appliance (LSA) Code Chapter IV/ 4.4).

While proper procedures should be followed during routine testing and operation of outboard motors, AMSA PSCOs have observed that some crew operate the motor without any cooling water, which will result in damage of the water pump and possibly result in failure.

Even testing using an external pressurised water supply has limitations, as these do not demonstrate that the water pump is capable of taking suction and circulating water through the motor.

An effective operational test is to submerge the motor leg in water to a depth which will cover the inlet ports. When the motor is started, the pump circulates water through the motor and out through the exhaust outlet. The pump condition and circulation is verified by observing the cooling water flow through the water flow indication (tell-tale) hole as indicated in Figure 1. The manufacturer’s advice with respect to flushing of cooling water passages with fresh water after use must always be followed.

Figure: 1

During inspections of outboard motors, AMSA PSCOs have found various defects including:

• blocked cooling water inlet mesh/ports;
• tell-tale holes blocked by salt deposits, broken pieces of rubber or by paint;
• worn out impellers (Figure 2);
• salt water deposits in cooling water passages.

All these defects could lead to serious engine damage due to overheating.

Figure: 2

Fuel and oil

Rescue boats have either 2-stroke or 4-stroke petrol (gasoline) outboard motors (diesel outboard motors are available but not common). Use of improper fuel can damage the engine or result in starting difficulties.

AMSA PSCOs have found that manufacturer’s operating manuals are not always available and crew are unsure of the type of outboard motor fitted and its associated systems. 4-stroke motors require no mixing of oil and fuel. Some 2-stroke designs use oil injection systems, while others require pre-mixing of oil and fuel.

Fuel problems are the most common cause for an engine failing to start. Generally, the fuel is either too old, contaminated, not the correct mix, or may not be able to be ignited due to the spark plugs being fouled by oily residue.

Sufficient fuel (for maintaining a speed of at least 6 knots for a period of at least 4 hrs) must be carried on-board and stored in approved containers. Fuel systems are to be approved and fitted tanks are to be specially protected against fire & explosion. (LSA Code Chapter V/ 5.1.1.8).

Best practice guidance

Safety of Life At Sea (SOLAS) and the International Safety management (ISM) Code require that ships crews are properly familiarised with the operation and maintenance of emergency equipment, including rescue boat outboard motors. The ISM Code, under element 10.3, requires that companies identify equipment the sudden operational failure of which may result in a hazardous situation. Specific measures should be provided in the Safety Management System (SMS) to promote the reliability of such equipment.

The ship’s SMS should ensure that effective maintenance procedures for rescue boat inboard and/or outboard motors are developed and included in the ship’s planned maintenance system. Manufacturers instruction manuals must also be available on-board, as should a fully inventory of the manufacturer recommended spares, such as fuel and oil filters, spark-plugs and water pump impeller.

Download Marine notice 12/2017 Operation and maintenance of rescue boat outboard motors (PDF 177 KB) PDF176.36 KB

Gary Prosser
Deputy Chief Executive Officer
Australian Maritime Safety Authority
October 2017

GPO Box 2181
CANBERRA ACT 2601

Australian biofouling management requirements

New requirements for managing biofouling on international vessels arriving in Australia began on 15 June 2022.

Operators of all vessels subject to biosecurity control will be required to provide information on how biofouling has been proactively managed prior to arriving in Australian territorial seas.

This information will need to be reported through the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s Maritime Arrivals Reporting System (MARS).

The department will use the information to target vessel interventions. This will allow more efficient use of resources and statutory powers to assess and inspect vessels, and more effective response to unacceptable biosecurity risks associated with biofouling.

Vessel operators will receive less intervention for biofouling if they comply with one of the following 3 accepted biofouling management practices:

1. Implementation of an effective biofouling management plan
2. Hull and niche areas cleaned of all biofouling within 30 days prior to arriving in Australian territory, or
3. Implementation of an alternative biofouling management method pre-approved by the department.

A vessel operator that has not applied one of these 3 accepted biofouling management practices will be subject to further questions and assessment of the biosecurity risk associated with biofouling on the vessel.

Australia will phase in the introduction of the new requirements. From 15 June 2022 to 15 December 2023 an education-first approach will be taken to assist vessels to comply. However, powers under the Biosecurity Act 2015 will continue to be used to manage any unacceptable biosecurity risks associated with biofouling.

The Australian biofouling management requirements are available at Managing biofouling in Australia. Future updates will be available through the department’s subscription centre (select Import Industry Advice Notices under Import News).

2015 Anti-Fouling and In-Water Cleaning Guidelines for Australia and New Zealand

The 2015 Anti-fouling and in-water cleaning guidelines (2015 Guidelines) provide guidance on best-practice approaches for:

• shore-based application, maintenance, removal and disposal of anti-fouling coatings, and
• in-water cleaning of vessels and movable structures to minimise environmental risk.

The 2015 Guidelines are available on the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s website.

Persons who wish to undertake in-water cleaning of vessels in Australian jurisdictions should:

• check their obligations under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (the EPBC Act) as outlined by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry.
• if the EPBC Act is not triggered by the proposed activity, review the general recommendations about in-water cleaning in Commonwealth waters, and
• refer to the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s website for further advice and information on seeking permission to undertake in-water cleaning in Commonwealth or State and Territory waters. Relevant State, Territory and Commonwealth jurisdiction contact points are also available on this webpage.

The Australian in-water cleaning standards

Australia is developing Australian in-water cleaning standards that will specify the minimum requirements for in-water cleaning of biofouling from vessels in Australian territorial seas.

The objectives of the standards are to manage the biosecurity and chemical contamination risks associated with in-water cleaning to a minimum acceptable level and to support consistent regulatory decision-making across Australia.

Regulatory approval is required to undertake in-water cleaning operations within Australian territorial seas. The standards will be used by regulators to assess in-water cleaning activities in their jurisdiction.

The Australian in-water cleaning standards will be finalised and published on the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s webpage Australian in-water cleaning standards. These standards will supersede the in-water cleaning guidance in the 2015 Guidelines.

IMO Biofouling Guidelines

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) 2011 Guidelines for the control and management of ships’ biofouling to minimize the transfer of invasive aquatic species (Biofouling Guidelines) are intended to provide a globally consistent approach to the management of biofouling. This is through providing information on general measures to minimise the risks associated with biofouling for all types of vessels.

The Biofouling Guidelines are currently under review at the IMO with the final report to be completed in 2023. The intent of this review is to improve the uptake and effectiveness of the Biofouling Guidelines.

The Biofouling Guidelines and a copy of Resolution MEPC.207(62) can be obtained from the IMO website.

Further information for managing biofouling and in-water cleaning can be found on the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry’s website or by contacting marinepests@awe.gov.au.